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Abstract. Eﬃcient and secure management of access to resources is
a crucial challenge in today’s corporate IT environments. During the
last years, introducing company-wide Identity and Access Management
(IAM) infrastructures building on the Role-based Access Control (RBAC)
paradigm has become the de facto standard for granting and revoking
access to resources. Due to its static nature, the management of role-
based IAM structures, however, leads to increased administrative eﬀorts
and is not able to model dynamic business structures. As a result, intro-
ducing dynamic attribute-based access privilege provisioning and revo-
cation is currently seen as the next maturity level of IAM. Nevertheless,
up to now no structured process for incorporating Attribute-based Access
Control (ABAC) policies into static IAM has been proposed. This paper
closes the existing research gap by introducing a novel migration guide for
extending static IAM systems with dynamic ABAC policies. By means of
conducting structured and tool-supported attribute and policy manage-
ment activities, the migration guide supports organizations to distribute
privilege assignments in an application-independent and ﬂexible manner.
In order to show its feasibility, we provide a naturalistic evaluation based
on two real-world industry use cases.
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1 Motivation
The eﬀective and secure management of employees’ access to sensitive appli-
cations and data is one of the biggest security challenges for today’s organiza-
tions [19]. A variety of national and international regulations or certiﬁcations
like Basel III [3], the Sarbanes-Oxley-Act of 2002 [45], or the ISO 27000 fam-
ily [23] together with internal guidelines force enterprises to audit and control
actions within their systems. At the same time developments like the application
of cloud-based services in corporate environments further underline the need for
secure user management.
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As a result, centralized Identity and Access Management (IAM) relying on
the Role-based Access Control (RBAC) [43] paradigm became the core element
for increasing user management eﬃciency and reduce related IT security risks
over the last years. However, due to its static nature, the application of RBAC
leads to a considerable amount of administrative overhead. Growing numbers of
outdated roles stemming from organizational changes together with the need of
manually administrating user role assignments as well as role permission assign-
ments result in complex and outdated RBAC structures. Even disregarding the
fact that it takes an average of 18months for its initial implementation, RBAC
consumes an average of 2,410,000$ for a ﬁrm of 10,000 employees [34]. As a
result, researchers and practitioners recently started to point out the need for
dynamic access privilege management IAM infrastructures [14,27,42].
Using Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) policies [20] for dynamically
granting and revoking access based on employees’ and privileges’ attributes (from
hereinafter referred to as dynamic Identity and Access Management (dIAM)) is
seen as the next maturity level of company-wide IAM. The ABAC paradigm
in general is based on the presumption that using a subject’s, object’s, and
their shared context’s attributes an authorization decision can be made. ABAC
research traditionally focused on aspects like expressing ABAC rules (e.g. using
XACML as standardized language) while only little attention has been paid to
its adoption in company-wide IAM environments. This adaptation requires the
deﬁnition of a potentially high number of policies within the central IAM system,
the enforcement of policy decisions within the legacy applications depending on
their underlying access control models, as well as the continuous policy mainte-
nance. In order to complete these tasks, companies require a guided approach
which is able to manage organizational project complexity as well es the tech-
nical heterogeneity of involved applications and protocols. To the best of our
knowledge, no such structured approach has been provided up to now.
In this paper we are closing the existing research gap by ﬁrstly investigating
the main building blocks required for dIAM infrastructures (Sect. 3). Secondly
we propose a migration guide for implementing dIAM which serves as a project
guideline dividing the necessary steps into manageable activities (Sect. 4). We
thirdly evaluate our work within two real world use cases in the insurance and
research industry. Besides the theoretical structuring of activities we identiﬁed
the need for automation and thus additionally provided a prototypical software
implementation for executing single activities of our migration guide. In order
to achieve this we extended an existing IAM-tool proposed in [10] with attribute
management and policy generation functionality. This allowed us to facilitate
available functionality (e.g. data import or data visualization) and further eval-
uate our migration guide within real-life projects (see Sect. 5).
2 Related Work
Traditionally, Identity and Access Management in organizations has been asso-
ciated with storing user data, maintaining user accounts, and controlling users’
access to applications [11]. In today’s medium to large-sized companies a cen-
tralized management of users following the RBAC paradigm has become the
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de facto standard approach for handling the challenges imposed by a steadily
growing number of digital identities as well as access privileges. Recent surveys
underline this growing importance of roles in information security in general and
in IAM environments in particular [13]. However, over time and without proper
controls such as de-provisioning processes, the number of roles is steadily grow-
ing, contradicting the beneﬁts of administrative cost reduction [9]. In order to
keep role systems up to date, methodologies and metrics for the ongoing opti-
mization of role-based IAM infrastructures are required [10,26]. Nonetheless, the
static concept of roles in general lacks the ability to adopt to company changes
and struggles with situational adaptivity [42]. Both requirements, however, are
main challenges of modern IAM infrastructures.
As a result, companies aim at enhancing their existing IAM systems with
dynamic ABAC policies in order to increase provisioning capabilities, strate-
gically reduce administrative tasks, and keep IAM infrastructures manageable
[21]. While standard ABAC protocols like the eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) [33] have been around since 2003, Priebe et al. [36] and
Yuan et al. [52] were the ﬁrst to formally deﬁne ABAC as an access control
model. However, their focus was on formalizing the model and did not consider
an application-independent IAM scenario. Jin et al. suggest an attribute-based
architecture for IAM focusing on attribute correlation and attribute importance
in diﬀerent IAM-related domains [25]. Their work, however, does not aim at sup-
porting organizations during the set up of a dIAM system. Recently, Hu et al.
[20] were amongst the ﬁrst to provide generalized deﬁnitions and best practices
while also giving recommendations on deploying ABAC in cross-application set-
tings. They, however, neither provide the structured guidance nor an overview
on how to adopt ABAC in an organization-wide IAM system.
Up to now, to the best of our knowledge, no approach constituting the
single building blocks of ABAC-based company-wide IAM and aligning them
into a structured process model exists. We close this gap in the remainder by
ﬁrstly gathering the aforementioned building blocks on the basis of a thorough
research review (Sect. 3). Secondly, we structure them in the form of a migration
guide which can be employed by organizations that aim at extending their static
identity- or role-based IAM towards the integration of ABAC policies (Sect. 4).
3 Building Blocks of Dynamic Identity and Access
Management
In the following we present the core elements of dIAM systems derived from
ABAC literature (e.g. building on the ﬁndings of [20]) as well as literature from
related areas, such as data and information quality management or policy man-
agement. Even though most works do not consider their application for company-
wide IAM in particular, researchers in general already identiﬁed attribute man-
agement as well as policy management as the two main aspects of any ABAC
implementation. Attribute management [6,8,16,20,35,37,52] in general deals
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with requirements related to the attributes used within ABAC policies, rang-
ing from the aggregation of attributes up to their ongoing maintenance. Policy
management [4,15,20,22,24,30,37] deals with the development and continuous
improvement of access policies.
3.1 Policy Management
While policies and their life-cycle in general have been studied in various research
areas (e.g. [7]), researchers recently stated the need for a structured approach
for policy management in IAM. Building on the generic policy life-cycle model
proposed by Buecker et al. ([7], see Fig. 1) we outline relevant aspects of policy
management in IAM in the following.
Fig. 1. Policy management based on [7] including corresponding dIAM aspects
Language Agreement. The ﬁrst challenge prior to deﬁning policies is the
agreement upon a common expression language providing the syntax for depict-
ing the semantics of policies interpreted by an IAM infrastructure. Looking at
the research area, language requirements have been investigated [44] and com-
parisons of the suitability of policy languages (e.g. [17]) such as XACML [33] or
EPAL [1] have been provided. Other authors like Strembeck [48] rather suggest
generating a customized policy language tailored to the speciﬁc needs of a cer-
tain scenario. Within the area of IAM, however, a standardized approach seems
more promising due to the high number of diﬀerent applications and stakeholders
involved.
Guidelines. Besides a common policy language, the establishment of policy
guidelines plays an important role during the development as well as mainte-
nance of dIAM systems. Policy guidelines are representing general rules on how
policies are to be developed within a speciﬁc context. Note that in complex sce-
narios contradicting policies could potentially be deﬁned. As a result, the estab-
lishment of design guidelines is mandatory in order to avoid semantically correct
but ineﬃciently modeled and contradicting policies. Beckerle and Martucci [4]
were the ﬁrst to formally deﬁne security and manageability goals for policies.
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They exclusively examined general goals for security and authorization rules.
However, their results also can be applied in the context of IAM. Examples
include the following goals provided in [4]:
– Rule sets have to grant authorized access.
– Redundant rules need to be removed.
– Contradicting rules need to be removed.
– Concise rule sets are better than large rule sets.
By means of such exemplary guidelines organizations can increase policy homo-
geneity and ease policy maintenance.
Development. Policy Development deals with the actual creation of policies.
Choosing an appropriate policy development methodology within a given sce-
nario (i.e. an IAM project) is crucial for project success. Available methodologies
can be divided into policy engineering and policy mining approaches (see Fig. 2).
Policy engineering deals with the top-down extraction of policies from business
processes or workﬂows [2,5], optionally based on security policy templates as
shown in [41]. Authors agree that the policy notation used during policy devel-
opment [47] and the provided tool-support [46] are critical success factors for
policy engineering. Policy mining, in contrast, applies data mining technologies
for extracting policies from Natural Language Policies [29,49], currently assigned
access privileges [50], or access logs [22,51]. While providing an increased level of
automation, policy mining lacks the integration of business know-how and strug-
gles with low-quality attribute values - above all in the context of company-wide
IAM involving numerous stakeholders and policies. Research results from related
areas [11] underline that in such scenarios a hybrid approach building on both,
an increased level of automation as well as the integration of expert knowledge,
is the most promising method for policy modeling.
Fig. 2. Policy development methods
Simulation, Translation and Implementation. In company-wide IAM sys-
tems a potentially large number of ABAC policies aﬀecting thousands of access
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privilege assignments might be required. As a result, a tool-supported simula-
tion for anticipating the consequences of newly introduced policies becomes a
central step during the setup of a policy base. Simulation tools can support the
integration of policy owner feedback prior to policy activation as well as depict
the future state of access within systems managed by an IAM infrastructure
(e.g. using visual investigations as proposed in [31]). After simulation the poli-
cies need to be mapped onto the access control models of the legacy applications
connected to an IAM. Those applications commonly are based on static access
control models (e.g. SAP based on static roles or the Microsoft Active Directory
(AD) based on groups). As a result, the IAM system in place has to carry out
the required translations, i.e. the provisioning of dynamically calculated access
privileges using static access control concepts (e.g. SAP roles).
Optimization. Once simulated and implemented, policies require the continu-
ous monitoring of their correctness and validity by applying automated analyt-
ical methods. Note that due to the high number of expected policies a manual
analysis is not feasible in the context of IAM. Lu et al., for instance, provide
an approach for discovering inconsistencies and errors within policies at design-
time [28]. Recently, Hummer et al. [22] proposed an approach that allows for
a structured optimization of policies without interfering with a running IAM
system. They apply anomaly detection methods in order to highlight deviations
of normal policy patterns and visually present them to human policy engineers.
3.2 Attribute Management
Besides policy-related activities, attributes and their management form the foun-
dation of any ABAC implementation. Attribute management is of great impor-
tance for company-wide IAM Despite its importance for company-wide IAM
where employees are managed based upon master data attributes and access
privileges are handled using attributes. However, attribute management in IAM
has not attracted researchers’ attention to a great extent up to now.
System and Attribute Selection. The initial selection and deﬁnition of appli-
cation systems as well as related attributes managed within the ABAC policies
[20] is the foundation for structured attribute management for dIAM. Note that
in case an organization already has a deployed IAM system, basic attribute
selection already took place during the initial system setup. Nevertheless, a re-
investigation and potential extension of attribute sets commonly needs to be
executed. Several master data attributes stored within a personnel management
system might, for instance, be unused up to now but needed during later policy
deﬁnition (e.g. an employee’s job position or cost center).
Constraints and Data Types. After selecting required attributes, a deﬁnition
of their data types, values and constraints needs to be carried out. Data types
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commonly range from boolean to single-valued and multi-valued attributes [6].
Researchers recently analyzed the eﬀects of policy evaluation performance and
highlighted its relation to the used attributes and attribute values [32]. Regarding
attribute constraints, Bijon et al., for instance, introduce constraints on attribute
assignments and values [6]. As further examples, Jin et al. provide a methodology
for the classiﬁcation of attributes according to their criticality and importance
for access [25], while there also exists an overview of data and systems that are
typically involved in an IAM environment [22].
Data Integration. As aforementioned, company-wide IAM commonly han-
dles large amounts of data stemming from numerous applications, databases,
or directory services. Organizations already operating an IAM hence need to
review and extend existing integration processes to reﬂect the needs of future
dynamic ABAC policies. IAM systems in general diﬀerentiate between source
and target systems whereas a source system for certain attributes can act as
target system for other attributes at the same time. An example could be an
HR system providing master data of employees while at the same time receiving
employees’ email addresses from a mail application. Note that the deﬁnition of
master sources for attributes has implications on attribute ownership. It is e.g.
likely that human resources representatives are responsible for reviewing and
validating attributes stemming from the personnel system.
Cleansing and Quality Controls. Policies created on the basis of erroneous
attribute values essentially lead to security vulnerabilities, compliance violations,
and administrative overhead. As a result, a structured review and cleansing of
incorporated attribute values is a mandatory building block of dIAM prior to
policy development. For an overview of potential data quality problems, cf. [39].
Hummer et al. recently argued that for optimizing policies, a centralized view on
available and utilizable attributes spanning all involved systems is necessary in
order to detect data errors and inconsistencies [22]. Data cleansing additionally
builds on available attribute quality controls (e.g. rules for valid attribute values).
Such quality controls, e.g., support the automated monitoring of attribute value
changes and the advent of new attribute values and attribute types. We suggest
to apply measures and metrics (for an overview cf. [18]) as well as best practices
[40] from the ﬁeld of data and information quality management to address these
challenges.
4 Migration Guide
After describing the building blocks of an ABAC-based IAM, this Section of the
paper introduces our tool-supported migration guide supporting a step-by-step
migration from an existing static towards a dynamic IAM solution. It consists
of three phases, namely a preparatory phase, an implementation phase and a
maintenance phase (see Fig. 3). The goal of the preparatory phase is to achieve
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Fig. 3. Process model for migrating towards dIAM
a common understanding of policies and provide an attribute base used during
later process phases. The subsequent implementation phase covers the cleansing
of attributes and actual development of policies while the maintenance phase
provides measures for continuous monitoring and improvement of the policy
system. Note that due to space restrictions we cannot provide a detailed pre-
sentation of all involved sub-activities but rather aim at giving an overview of
required tasks. In order to increase automation, we implemented a prototypi-
cal software for supporting the execution of attribute and policy management
activities (Phase 2 of our migration guide). It is able to exchange data with an
existing IAM system supporting the respective ABAC implementation process.
4.1 Preparation Phase
Due to the complexity and heterogeneity of static IAM environments, several
preparatory activities have to be completed before ABAC policies can be deﬁned.
Relevant systems, attributes, responsibilities, and guidelines have to be reviewed
and deﬁned in order to foster a common understanding on a technical as well as
organizational level among involved stakeholders.
Attribute Management. During system and attribute selection source sys-
tems for attribute data (e.g. personnel management systems) need to be investi-
gated for attributes required during policy deﬁnition (Activity 1.3). Additional
sources like IAM systems themselves or other applications providing informa-
tion about user accounts or access privileges (e.g. ownership, criticality) might
be identiﬁed. Note that organizations having basic attribute synchronization
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processes in place commonly have not dealt with the facilitation of extended
attributes for complex access control decisions. By investigating system docu-
mentation or conducting expert interviews they hence need to review and extend
the currently used attribute types in order to reﬂect ABAC requirements.
At the same time, data types need to be deﬁned and constraint deﬁnitions
for the attributes need to be established (Activity 1.4, cf. Sect. 3, Constraints &
Data Types). This, amongst others, includes the deﬁnition of data types, master
data sources, data ownerships, valid attribute values, or attribute ranges, i.e.
intervals (if the data type is a numeric type) of validity. This way, erroneous
attribute values can be identiﬁed during the subsequent cleansing activities.
After successfully completing the system and attribute selection and deﬁni-
tion of constraints and data types, the attribute synchronization (Activity 1.5)
takes place. Attribute values are imported into the IAM during this phase. At
the same time conﬂicts like diﬀerent encodings or granularity issues (e.g. address
vs. street and zip code) can be detected.
Policy Management. Regarding policy management, a general language
agreement (Activity 1.1) for policy expression as well as the deﬁnition of policy
guidelines need to be established prior to policy creation. Most of the currently
available IAM implementations, for instance, are able to foster XACML as stan-
dardized policy language. Additionally, a shared understanding among project
stakeholders on an organizational level needs to be established in the form of
a company-wide glossary with deﬁnitions for important terminology. Available
policy types like grant or denial policies should, for instance, be described. Fur-
thermore, guidelines for policies (Activity 1.2, cf. Sect. 3, Policy Guidelines) can
act as sources on how the human policy engineers are requested to model poli-
cies. Imagine a scenario in which only grant policies are allowed. Policy engineers
should hence not have the option to design denial policies throughout a tool-
supported policy creation process at all. Additionally, guidelines for the strategic
maintenance of policies (Phase 3 of our migration guide) need to be deﬁned. By
introducing policy and attribute ownerships and requiring a periodic certiﬁcation
process, companies can essentially increase long-term policy quality.
4.2 Implementation Phase
After the preparatory activities have been completed, organizations enter the
implementation phase (Phase 2) of our migration guide, i.e. the initial devel-
opment and setup of a dIAM based on ABAC policies. Concerning attribute
management, a systematic initial review and cleansing (Activity 2.1) of attribute
data is required before the initial creation of policies as well as their subsequent
simulation and implementation (Activities 2.2 and 2.3) can be carried out (cf.
Sect. 3, Policy Development; Simulation, Translation and Implementation).
Attribute Management. Medium and large-sized organizations commonly
struggle with data quality issues regarding their digital identities and access
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privileges. As a result, a dedicated cleansing process for improving attribute data
quality is a crucial success factor for implementing dIAM. Following an initial
assessment of attribute data (e.g. the identiﬁcation of empty or invalid attribute
values) the manual or automated cleansing of attributes needs to take place. We
argue that a tool-based detection and cleansing process fosters user adoption by
reducing the overall project complexity. Automated error identiﬁcation can, for
instance, be carried out by means of data mining or data quality metrics. Data
mining, for instance, can be applied to detect outliers and unusual attribute
values (see [12]). Based on predeﬁned quality metrics (e.g. general rules like the
currency [18] of an attribute value or a list of valid location attribute values) it
leads to an overall higher quality of deﬁned policies. Figure 4 (left side) gives a
simple attribute cleansing example by grouping current location attribute values
from a personnel system within our prototype after the attribute synchronization
took place. Existing data errors such as typos, diﬀerent language codings, or
misspellings can be identiﬁed easily. The right side of Fig. 4 displays the attribute
values after cleansing by human experts in collaboration with attribute owners.
Fig. 4. Before and after manual cleansing by grouping of attribute location and its
various occurrences
Policy Management. As aforementioned, a potentially high number of policies
bundling a wide range of access privileges or responsibilities are managed in
corporate IAM environments. As a result, a manual policy generation by human
policy engineers is not feasible. Organizations thus aim at employing automation
techniques for creating policies and reviewing them in a hybrid manner (e.g.
by experts who provide business knowledge and semantics, see Sect. 3). As one
example of a potential role development approach in large IAM environments,
we thus implemented policy mining algorithms that are able to automatically
generate candidates for grant policies based on given attribute information. In
order to support human review processes we additionally developed a simple
representation of policies using a wizard-based graphical interface within our
prototype (see Fig. 5).
Using this approach, a human policy engineer can select combinations of
available attributes (left side of Fig. 5, e.g. function and location) and option-
ally merge semantically or syntactically equivalent attribute values (right side of
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Fig. 5. Automated tool-based policy mining and review
Fig. 5, bundling the attribute values Munich and Nuremberg). In a second review
step, suggested policy candidates are then displayed to the policy engineer. Con-
tinuing our example above, access is granted on the basis of the combination of
employees’ location and function. As a result, three policies for each function
attribute value are generated, e.g. one policy for sales representatives in Berlin,
Frankfurt , and Munich/Nuremberg each. During review, a human policy engi-
neer can alter or remove unneeded policies (e.g. in case no sales representatives
are located in Frankfurt). During a third step our prototype calculates the access
rights shared by policy members based on customizable data mining algorithms.
This way, a policy engineer could, for instance, enforce that only access rights
that are not yet included in other policies are considered during the access priv-
ilege calculation or that critical access privileges are in general excluded from
policy generation.
Completing the third step of our policy development wizard, policy owners
are assigned and the policy candidates can be saved and exported to an IAM
system. Ownership assignment can take place either based on rules (e.g. line
managers are responsible for policies that aﬀect their department) or manually.
After agreeing upon policy deﬁnitions, their simulation and implementation
within an IAM test environment takes place. Due to the high number of organi-
zational changes (e.g. restructuring organizational hierarchies, ownerships, and
responsibilities) such policy simulation is a cornerstone of every policy modeling
initiative. After ﬁnal approval, the implementation of policies in the productive
system occurs.
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4.3 Maintenance Phase
The last phase of our migration guide (Phase 3) is dedicated to the continuous
improvement of the previously implemented ABAC policies. In order to ensure
long-term applicability of the deﬁned rule set and minimize system complexity
over time, a structured process for a periodic assessment and re-design of existing
and new policies needs to be established. As a result, the maintenance phase
deals with ensuring both, the correctness of policies and a high level of attribute
quality (Activities 3.1 and 3.2, cf. Sect. 3, Policy Optimization).
Attribute Management. Regarding attribute management (Activity 3.2), we
recommend the introduction of a structured monitoring process comprising two
main activities, namely the periodic identiﬁcation and review of quality metric
violations as well as the deﬁnition of organizational agreements.
Quality measures deﬁned during the previous phases of the migration guide
form the basis for continuous attribute quality assurance. Throughout automated
and periodic checks the correctness of attribute values can be investigated based
on given quality measures and outlier detection methodologies. Examples for
such checks can be periodic certiﬁcations of attributes by attribute owners or the
detection of wrong attribute values using valid value lists. Besides such technical
measures organizational agreements have to be made, e.g. in order to handle
scenarios when new applications are connected to an IAM. In such cases, the
IAM team has to decide whether the provided attributes fulﬁll the initially
established constraints and attribute quality levels.
Policy Management. Besides the strategic management of attribute types
and their values, the long-term maintenance of ABAC policies together with the
potentially automated proposal of newly required but not yet deﬁned policies
need to be ensured. Note that both maintenance activities are highly depen-
dent on each other. In contrast to attribute monitoring, discovering erroneous
and outdated policies requires an increased level of automation. While single-
valued attribute errors might be easily identiﬁed, a misconﬁguration of policies
granting critical access privileges can hardly be identiﬁed without tool-support.
For addressing this challenge, Hummer et al. recently suggested measures and
processes for strategic policy maintenance [22]. They, for instance, introduce
tool-supported outlier and anomaly detection for identifying unused or outdated
policies into the ﬁeld of IAM.
5 Evaluation
After proposing our migration guide we now execute a naturalistic ex post eval-
uation covering two industry use cases based on the evaluation framework by
Pries-Heje et al. [38]. The used real-life data-sets originate from companies oper-
ating in the health insurance in Switzerland (from hereinafter refereed to as
‘Insucomp’) as well as the research sector in Germany (from hereinafter refereed
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to as ‘Rescomp’). All attribute values have been anonymized accordingly. While
Rescomp already had a working IAM system in place, Insucomp conducted a
policy development project as part of their initiative to initially implement an
IAM system. The project duration was six months (Rescomp) and nine months
(Insucomp) respectively, with both projects sharing the same overall goals:
1. Automatically providing new employees with correct basic access.
2. Increasing the amount of automatically distributed privileges by using
dynamic provisioning policies.
In order to achieve these goals, both companies executed Phases 1 and 2 of our
migration guide and facilitated our prototypical tool implementation during pol-
icy development. Insucomp additionally implemented basic measures for policy
and attribute maintenance (Phase 3) while Rescomp plans to do so in future.
Note that even though both use cases only aimed at policy deﬁnition based on
subject attributes, our model can also be applied during the general development
of policies comprising subject, object, and environmental attributes.
5.1 Insucomp
Insucomp is employing 349 external and 866 internal employees which in total
own 7,777 accounts in 13 diﬀerent application systems, including one AD and
one SAP instance. In total, 2,297 diﬀerent access rights are directly assigned
to the user accounts resulting in 54,059 access rights assignments. Insucomp’s
variety of applications using static access privilege assignments in combination
with manual provisioning processes resulted in large administrative eﬀorts over
the last years. As a result, a new IAM system based on dynamic access control
policies had to be introduced between 2014 and 2015.
Preparation Phase. Throughout a kick-oﬀ workshop, Insucomp initially
taught policy engineers guidelines on how to semi-automatically construct poli-
cies (Activity 1.2) while the IAM software implemented during the overall IAM
project pre-deﬁned the applied policy language (Activity 1.1). In the speciﬁc
case the proprietary modeling capabilities of the Dell One Identity Manager
were employed due to the reduced expected technical implementation eﬀorts
required. The system and attribute selection (Activity 1.3) took place in an iter-
ative manner. Firstly, the HR system was deﬁned as source for employee master
data. The available attributes together with access privileges from all 13 applica-
tions were imported into our prototype. Consecutively, policy engineers and the
responsible line oﬃcers agreed upon the exclusion of certain access rights from
the Microsoft AD, the SAP, and the Customer Relationship Management system
from further consideration. This decision was based on several reasons: Firstly,
granting certain access rights in an automated manner would have resulted in
an increase of license costs. Secondly, selected access privileges from the Cus-
tomer Relationship Management system were classiﬁed as critical from an IT
security perspective and hence excluded from automated provisioning processes.
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Regarding the attributes for policy development, the domain experts and IAM
team selected an employee’s position as the main HR attribute for the policy
construction. Constraints and data types were deﬁned accordingly:
– C1: The German value for the position is used in policies.
– C2: A code is introduced for each value, referring to exactly one position.
– C3: A policy deﬁnition needs to contain both, a human-readable position as
well as its respective machine-readable 4-digit code.
– C4: The position is a string value.
During attribute synchronization (Activity 1.5), violations of those constraints
were identiﬁed. As an example, several languages were originally used to express
an employee’s position. In coordination with the HR department, the German
position attribute value (C1) was selected as the deﬁning attribute for later
policy evaluations. Other languages were excluded from the data import and
from now on are represented as translation of the main value (i.e. the German
value) within a new attribute ﬁeld in the HR system.
Implementation Phase. Following our migration guide a subsequent data
cleansing process was conducted. Inspecting all attribute values within our pro-
totype (Activity 2.1), Insucomp was, amongst others, able to discover ten erro-
neously deﬁned positions. Additionally, positions with an inappropriate seman-
tic granularity level were detected. For instance, initially one position for Clerk
Insurance Processing existed within the HR system. However, for representing
two semantically distinct insurance levels, Insucomp had to model two additional
types of clerks with diﬀerent access rights. As a result, the IAM team enforced
the creation of more detailed positions and codes within the HR system. In the
given example, two new positions were created in the HR system and employees
were assigned accordingly (see Fig. 6). Finishing the data cleansing activities a
total of 253 positions have been available in the ﬁnal attribute base.
After successful attribute cleansing, the actual detection of policy candidates
within our prototype and the respective review together with domain experts
took place (Activity 2.2). As a side eﬀect, Insucomp was able to discard 3,600
excessive assignments (i.e. 6.7% of all access privilege assignments) during the
policy review process as our prototype highlighted additional (potentially exces-
sive) privileges of employees assigned to a certain policy. This had a large impact
Fig. 6. Example for refactoring of employee positions
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on the overall project, further underlining the importance of secure provisioning
and de-provisioning processes based on dynamic policies.
Finally, Insucomp exported the deﬁned policies from our prototype and
imported them within their newly set-up IAM system (Activity 2.3). They ran-
domly selected sample policies in order to simulate correct functionality through-
out various identity lifecycle processes (i.e. onboarding, change, and oﬀboarding
of employees). As a result, a total of 253 policies were put into operation. This
led to the dynamic provisioning of 32% of all access rights among Insucomp’s 13
connected application systems, essentially reducing the manual administrative
workload while at the same time increasing the level of IT security.
Maintenance Phase. At the end of the migration project, Insucomp deﬁned
measures and quality controls in order to ensure the correctness of policies and
attributes (Phase 3 of our migration guide). For conducting structured attribute
management (Activity 3.2) newly introduced or changed attributes or attribute
values have to be reported by the HR department to the IAM team in the future
in order to adapt policies accordingly. Policy optimization has not been carried
out up to now but is one element of the Insucomp IAM roadmap within the next
year.
5.2 Rescomp
Rescomp already employed a working IAM system prior to the beginning of
their policy deﬁnition project. Nonetheless, user management still was executed
manually to a large extent for the 473 employees and the 761 diﬀerent access
rights (5,774 user privilege assignments in total). Rescomp’s dynamic research
environment requires automated and ﬂexible access privilege provisioning in the
future (e.g. for external employees like students needing temporary access to
critical company data while undergoing regular organizational changes at the
same time). As a result, a dIAM migration project was initiated in 2014. Similar
to Insucomp, Rescomp executed the ﬁrst two phases of our migration guide. Even
though they have not executed maintenance activities up to now, they recently
deﬁned policy optimization as one element of their future IAM roadmap.
Preparation Phase. As a preparatory activity, Rescomp deﬁned general guide-
lines for policy modeling (Activity 1.2). They introduced three types of valid
policies, namely location-based policies, department and type-based policies, as
well as function-based policies. Location-based policies represent the physical
location of employees e.g. for granting physical access to buildings. Department-
and type-based polices, in contrast, are deﬁned based on the departmental assign-
ment of employees in combination with their type, essentially granting access to
departmental ﬁle shares for internals, trainees, students, or externals. In addi-
tion, function-based policies were deﬁned to further reﬁne employee’s access
rights according to their job function. Besides the three policy types, the IAM
team deﬁned a guideline regarding the deﬁnition of empty policies, i.e. policies
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that currently no employee is matching. In accordance with their project goals
they decided to prepare such policies prior to an initial match of an employee
(Activity 1.2). They, for instance, created a policy for all members of the tech-
nical service department whose type of contract is student. Students might only
work within the department during their term holidays and thus the according
policy might be unused for certain periods of the year but still is required during
other months.
Following the migration guide, they selected two installations of their
Microsoft AD for inclusion of access rights and provided the employee attributes
from the HR system in place. During Activity 1.4 department, type of contract,
function, project and location were selected as attribute base for policy deﬁn-
ition. Similarly to Insucomp, Rescomp deﬁned constraints and data types for
these attributes. They, for instance, decided that regarding the types of contract
internals, apprentices, and students should be treated equally in terms of their
access rights.
Implementation Phase. Due to an already high attribute quality provided
by the HR system, attribute cleansing was not required as no errors were identi-
ﬁed during the attribute investigation. As a result, the IAM team subsequently
conducted the policy development (Activity 2.2) in cooperation with business
representatives. They started with the deﬁnition of basic location policies and
continued with the creation of department and employee type-based policies as
Fig. 7. Example policy export using XML notation
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well as policies for employees’ function attributes. Business representatives were
asked to review the policy candidates using our prototype. In total, this process
lead to the deﬁnition of 449 policies for automatic access privilege assignments,
covering a total of 34.8% of all managed access privileges. Regarding the access
rights, 45.9% of all initially existing privileges can now be assigned in an auto-
matic way, i.e. they are included in at least one policy. All policies were exported
from our prototype using the XML-notation and consecutively transferred into
the existing LDAP-based IAM system of Rescomp using custom Python scripts
(Activity 2.3). Figure 7 presents a short XML export example of one depart-
ment and employee type-based policy bundling students, trainees, and intern-
ships within a controlling department.
6 Conclusion
Dynamically assigning and revoking access privileges in company-wide IAM
infrastructures has gained signiﬁcant importance when it comes to automated
and secure user management. Migrating to a dynamic IAM infrastructure based
on ABAC policies can decrease manual administrative eﬀorts while at the same
time increasing the overall IT security level within companies. In order to support
organizations during their required migration eﬀorts, we proposed a novel three-
step migration guide for implementing dynamic IAM based on ABAC policies in
a structured manner. Up to now, no such structured process model highlighting
and coordinating the respective migration tasks has been proposed. Our migra-
tion guide covers the required preparation, setup, as well as maintenance tasks
and additionally oﬀers tool-support in order to automate attribute and policy
management activities. By doing so it increases the ﬂexibility of policy engi-
neers, reduces errors during policy modeling, and speeds-up the overall process
of policy creation. Evaluating our migration guide throughout two real-life use
cases we have further underlined its practical applicability.
In the future, we plan to extend our software prototype by implementing
automated identity attribute monitoring activities that support companies dur-
ing long-term attribute maintenance. In contrast to organizational guidelines
this would support the enforcement of quality rules for attribute management.
Additionally, we plan to expand policy development and policy maintenance
capabilities in order to allow for a better cooperation between the responsible
domain experts and the policy engineers.
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